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The problem of state capacity and taxation in less developed countries 
Resource mobilization lies at the heart of economic development. And among various 
means of resource mobilization (e.g., forced savings, inflation tax, manipulation of 
terms of trade, etc.), tax is the most closely related to questions of state formation and 
capability. Tax also provides one of the principal lenses in measuring state capacity, 
power and political settlements in a society. In the wake of fiscal crises of the state in 
sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, designing tax systems that can provide 
incentives for growth, can meet distributional demands and can increase revenue 
collection is central to state viability and effectiveness (Toye, 2000). In post-war 
economies, reconstruction of the revenue base is essential for the reconstruction of a 
viable state and sustained peace (Addison et al., 2002). 
Surprisingly, taxation is not explicitly listed as a separate ‘fundamental’ task of a state 
(as spelled out in the World Development Report 1997).2 This error of omission is 
indeed remarkable given the centrality of revenue production and resource mobilisation 
in the historical process of state formation (Schumpeter [1918], 1954; Tilly, 1990). As 
Schumpeter notes: ‘the fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its 
general history’ (quoted in Levi, 1988: 6).3 The neglect of making tax central to 
understanding state capacity and governance reflects the decline in the political 
economy of resource mobilisation as a focal point of development theory and policy. 
This is not to say that tax reform has not been a central part of World Bank and IMF 
operations in structural adjustment reform. However, tax reform has been largely 
couched in technical, non-political terms. This is part of the larger reform agenda where 
state capacity-building has been viewed largely as a ‘technical’ exercise in 
administrative reform (raising wages of civil servants, more training, greater 
meritocracy). According to the diagnosis of the capacity approach, ‘poor governance’ is 
the result of an over-extended state relative to its institutional capacity at a given 
moment in time (see World Bank 1997: 61-75). The analysis of governance crucially 
assumes that inherited capacity constrains and that this constraint is what should orient 
the shape of administrative, institutional and policy reform. The policy advice, 
therefore, for poorly performing economies generally advocates reducing the state’s role 
in resource allocation decisions. The main message of the capacity approach is ‘don’t 
                                                 
1   Quoted in O’Brien (2001: 25). 
2   According to the World Bank (1997: 41-60), the five ‘fundamentals’ that lie at the core of good 
governance for a state are: a) establishing a foundation of law, b) maintaining a non-distortionary 
policy environment, including macroeconomic stability, c) investing in basic social services and 
infrastructure, d) protecting the vulnerable and e) protecting the environment. While tax is not 
explicitly mentioned as a core function of governance, tax capacity is implicitly behind items [c] and 
[d]. 
3   Or as Rudolph Goldscheid notes: ‘the budget is the skeleton of a state stripped of all misleading 
ideologies.’ (quoted in Levi, 1988: 6).   2
try difficult interventions and reforms at home’. The technical and apolitical nature of 
the good governance agenda, however, limits an understanding of the political and 
institutional processes underlying the power and legitimacy a state requires to enforce 
and change rights and institutions, and to extract and mobilise the resources required to 
sustain development and growth.  
Fiscal crises confronting many LDC’s in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have 
necessitated bringing fiscal reform to the centre of macroeconomic stabilisation 
processes (Moore and Schneider, 2004). However, the tax component of the 
Washington Consensus follows along the lines of the capacity approach. The main 
policy proposals have been to simplify and broaden tax bases, lower income and 
corporate tax rates (that is, make taxes more pro-business), promote reduction in trade 
tax rates through trade liberalisation, and emphasize the widening and simplification of 
value-added taxes (VAT). Importantly, the latter is promoted on the grounds not only 
that it is less distortionary, but also that it is administratively and politically easier to 
implement than income and property taxes.4 Because property and, particularly, income 
taxes are generally the most progressive taxes, equity concerns have been downplayed, 
which may have important implications for political stability in countries with very 
unequal levels of asset and income distribution. 
The order of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 considers the economic, 
administrative, and political economy approaches to analyzing tax and the policy 
implications derived from the insights of each approach. Based on the theoretical and 
historical insights developed in the critical examination of different approaches to tax, I 
argue that it is essential to consider the historical, political and institutional factors that 
have established durable tax collection capacity in some cases and not others. Section 3 
provides an examination of the political economy underlying the extraordinary success 
of tax collection and, in particular, income tax capacity collection in South Africa. A 
brief comparison with the Brazilian experience is presented to highlight the importance 
of historical political economy analysis in understanding variations in income tax 
capacity across countries. Section 4 complements the Brazil-South Africa comparison 
by presenting a comparison of the structure of tax collection in East Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. The evidence suggests that the Latin American state relies to 
a much greater extent on indirect taxes, revealing both policy choices and a weakness of 
the state to extract resources from upper income groups. Section 5 examines the 
political economy of tax in low income/post-war economies and highlights the 
importance of the relationship of taxation to state-building and legitimacy and the need 
to consider gradual trade liberalisation as a policy to maintain tax revenues when the 
administrative and political capacity to collect alternative taxes are minimal. Section 6 
briefly considers the magnitude of tax revenue losses due to capital flight and presents 
recent policy reforms to the international financial architecture to address this problem. 
The conclusion presents policy implications. 
                                                 
4   The advocacy for tax simplifications and tax neutrality have been the result of disillusionment with 
progressive tax structures in enhancing vertical equity in the 1970s and 1980s (Tanzi, 1992); and the 
influence of neo-liberal ideas such as supply-side economics, which views state intervention, and 
direct taxes in particular, as providing disincentives for productive investment. Moreover, as a result 
of globalisation, the desire to attract foreign investment has created intense tax competition among 
states, which has created pressure to keep income taxes low.   3
2  Approaches to analysing taxation 
The determinants of tax collection and tax reform have been the subject of extensive 
analysis. Several theoretical approaches inform debates on two main issues: first, why 
tax collection increases over time and, second, should the main concern be efficiency or 
equity when designing tax systems. There are three main approaches to these issues: the 
economic approach, the administrative approach, and the political economy approach. 
While the first two approaches have dominated theoretical and policy debates on tax in 
developing countries, the incorporation of political economy factors such as the role of 
threat, the perception of threat, and interest group formation and balances is essential to 
understanding the evolution of tax capacity. 
2.1  The economic analysis of tax 
Traditional tax analysis has focused on the design of tax systems that makes possible 
financing the ‘necessary’ level of public spending in the most efficient and equitable 
way (Stern, 1987; Tanzi & Zee, 2000). The neoclassical theory of public finance 
proceeds by describing the effects of taxation and then applying criteria (normally a 
social welfare function) to evaluate those effects (Stern, 1987: 24). This approach 
divides taxation into a logically-prior positive side and a subsequent normative side on 
which value judgements are introduced. Following Stern (1987), examples of positive 
issues include: a) the consequences of income or wealth taxation on risk-taking; b) the 
effects of corporate taxes on investment and distribution of profits; c) the effects of 
national debt and taxation on savings; and d) how different households or groups are 
affected or burdened by tax changes (the problem of incidence of tax). The basic 
problem in such a model is that the government wishes to raise revenue to distribute 
income without sufficient information on the preferences and endowments of citizens to 
do so by means of lump-sum taxes. Therefore, governments can achieve its goals only 
by raising taxes in some distortionary way. This gives rise to the standard neoclassical 
concern of the tension (or costs and benefits) between achieving equity and efficiency in 
a general equilibrium framework. 
An important component of the applied literature on tax concentrates on why the level 
and composition of taxes in less developed countries differs from more advanced 
countries.5 With respect to developing countries, the focus of the analysis centres on 
why their tax capacity is limited relative to more advanced countries. One set of factors 
concerns the economic structure of developing countries. For instance, developing 
countries are characterised by a large share of agriculture in total output and 
employment, large informal sectors and occupations; many small establishments, a 
small share of wages in total national income, a small share of total consumer spending 
made in large, modern establishments, and so on (ibid.: 3). These characteristics, it is 
argued, reduce the possibility of depending on certain types of taxes, such as personal 
income tax, and make them more dependent on indirect taxes such as foreign trade taxes 
and, result overall in a lower level of tax collection. 
                                                 
5   For reviews of economic theories of tax and the applied literature on developing countries, see, Gillis 
(1989); Burgess & Stern (1993); and Tanzi & Zee (2000).   4
Table 1: Resource mobilisation and poverty in developing countries: regional comparisons 
  GDP p.c. growth (1)Tax revenues (% GDP) (2) Gross savings (%GDP) (3) 
Regions (1985-2002)  1985-88  1997-2000  1980-901990-20001990-2002
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.4 21.7  16.3  13.9  12.5  12.7 
South Asia  3.3  12.8  12.2  13.5  16.7  16.8 
East Asia & Pacific  6.1  15.0  15.6  30.8 31.6  31.2 
Latin America  0.8  15.2  15.9  21.7  18.9  18.9 
Sources: (1) World Bank, World Development Indicators. (2) IMF Government Financial Statistics and 
calculations by the author. (3) World Bank (2004). 
The mainstream economic literature on tax, however, does not consider the wider 
resource mobilisation question, which was a concern of earlier development economists 
(e.g. Lewis, 1954). As indicated in Table 1, while tax revenues in sub-Saharan African 
and Latin American countries from the mid-1980s to 2000 were collected at a similar 
proportion to GDP as in East Asia, there were dramatic differences in the savings rates 
between the regions. 
The East Asian savings rate average is more than double as a percentage of GDP 
compared with South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa and two-thirds higher than in Latin 
America.6 
The state’s capacity to mobilise resources beyond taxation is one important feature of 
developmental success stories that the economic literature on tax misses. In particular, 
high levels of gross domestic savings have supported robust investment rates. The East 
Asian economies were in a class of their own in terms of savings rates. This was largely 
achieved through the coercive power of the state, which was deployed to mobilise 
resources through various forms of forced savings.7 Among the coercive elements in 
East Asian economies were restrictions on consumer credit, financial restraint, 
mandatory provident pension contributions (used in Singapore and Malaysia) and 
encouragement of postal savings. Although state actions to increase savings are clear in 
East Asia, the high and sustained growth rates may have also had an important feedback 
effect on income growth and therefore on sustaining savings. 
In sum, the economic approach to tax examines the trade-offs between efficiency and 
equity in a general equilibrium framework, and in the applied literature, examines the 
effects of levels of development and economic structure on tax takes and tax structure. 
The economic approach to tax does not consider the wider role of developmental states 
in mobilising savings. Also, this approach does not explain why tax structures differ in 
otherwise similar economies. Moreover, the economic approach abstracts from the 
political and institutional processes that determine the ability of the state to create tax 
policies and enforce them. 
                                                 
6   Kriekhaus (2002) argues that higher public savings as a percentage of GDP is correlated with higher 
growth rates in less developed countries.  
7   See Wade (1990); Chang (1994); Kohli (1999); and Huff (1995).   5
2.2  The administrative approach to tax 
The administrative approach focuses on the role institutional design and policy plays in 
enhancing the prospects of efficiency and effectiveness of the tax system. Efficiency 
refers to administrative costs in collecting different types of taxes, enforcing tax laws, 
and the costs of tax payers in complying with those laws (Lledo et al., 2004: 6). 
Effectiveness refers to the extent to which taxes are predictable, transparent, and 
enforced by a fair judicial system (ibid.). 
In line with the ‘technical’ view of institutions inherent in the above-mentioned capacity 
approach, administrative constraints are identified as the main constraint to the ability of 
states to collect revenues in general and direct taxes such as income tax in particular.8 
The detrimental factors commonly identified in developing country tax systems are: 
insufficient staff with appropriate skills, low public-sector wages, lack of up-to-date 
equipment and facilities, ill-defined and complex tax and related laws; poor 
enforcement of penalties for evasion and corruption; poor information collection and 
identification of taxpayers, and so on (see Kaldor, 1955; Bird, 1989: 315-46).9 Based on 
this approach, the policy advice is to simplify tax rates and laws, make revenue 
authorities as autonomous from political pressure as possible, and form tax policy based 
on the implementation capacity of the tax administration. 
There are many shortcomings to the administrative approach. First, the conception of 
capacity is static. There is no attempt to explain why and how administrative capacities 
change. Second, there is no explanation as to why tax capacities differ across countries. 
While much of the applied literature acknowledges political obstacles as the root cause 
of low tax collection (Bird & Oldman, 1964; Gillis, 1989; Burgess & Stern, 1993; Tanzi 
& Zee, 2000), there is no attempt to map which types of political obstacles matter more 
in some contexts as opposed to others. Third, there is little analysis as to why sound tax 
policies are not enforced. Although not often emphasised, low levels of legitimacy are 
often behind a state’s inability to ensure compliance (Levi, 1988) and the genesis and 
variation in this legitimacy is not analysed in the applied literature. Finally, as in the 
case of the capacity approach, the emphasis on discouraging the collection of taxes with 
high information requirements (such as income tax) does not provide the impetus for 
countries to improve administrative tax collection capacity for such taxes. 
Interestingly, the technical requirements of information collection and enforcement 
generally seem to be much more stringent in taxation than managing industrial policy, 
which is often dismissed on the grounds that it is too demanding for most developing 
countries. However, as seen in the case of East Asia, the conduct of industrial policy 
involves deliberative councils of a relatively small number of government bureaucrats 
and a relatively small number of medium and large firms or business conglomerates 
(see World Bank, 1993), and therefore has a much lower informational requirement than 
tax policy. The apparently sophisticated technical requirements of tax policy may be 
one of the principal reasons why the World Development Report 1997 neglects to 
discuss the political economy of taxation. 
                                                 
8   As Bird and Casanegra (1992) argue: ‘In developing countries, tax administration is tax policy.’ 
9   Because of these deficiencies, Bird (1989: 329), for instance, notes that ‘there is no place for an 
income (or other general direct) tax in any developing country.’   6
One recent development within the administrative approach has been the advocacy of 
autonomous revenues authorities (ARA’s). International financial institutions have 
developed the proposition that, in weak states, revenue collection authorities are more 
effective when they operate autonomously from the state (and particularly the finance 
ministry), and as a commercial entity at arms length from the government rather than as 
a department within the government administration (Taliciero, 2004). According to this 
line of thinking, autonomy protects revenue authorities from political interference and 
allows directors to circumvent the institutional obstacles of weak public sectors such as 
cumbersome regulations, low pay, antagonistic unions and so on (Therkilsden, 2003: 2). 
As a result, the creation of parallel agencies is favoured over the restructuring of 
existing tax institutions. 
While there is some evidence in Africa and Latin America that autonomous revenue 
authorities may have been instrumental in initiating reforms, it is less clear that such 
arrangements are sustainable. Typically, where there have been initial successes in the 
efficiency and legitimacy of tax collection, these gains have proved ephemeral.10 The 
Ugandan and Peruvian experiment with ARA’s were directed by Presidents who 
governed on a political strategy of anti-party politics, which made the revenue authority 
vulnerable to shifting policies and electoral calculations of the President. In each case, 
Museveni (in Uganda) and Fujimori (in Peru) terminated support of their respective 
ARA’s when the introduction of necessary taxes became unpopular. 
Such a technical approach to tax policy abstracts from politics in at least three ways. 
First, the reasons why such reforms were politically feasible in the first place are not 
addressed. Second, there is little analysis of why such autonomy is acceptable to 
relevant political coalitions over time. Third, there is no accepted definition of 
autonomy. Since tax policy, which is the domain of finance ministries, can not 
practically be divorced from tax collection, which is the domain of newly created 
ARA’s, it is not ultimately possible for the latter to operate in purely autonomous ways. 
In effect, autonomy can never be complete where there are inter-dependencies among 
agencies. Moreover, given the political nature of taxation, autonomy is always a 
contested notion (ibid.). 
While the theoretical and applied literature has identified many common problems 
among developing countries, the focus on tax collection in technical terms abstracts 
from an analysis of where and how the power of the state originates. As importantly, the 
economic literature is unable to explain the wide variation and growth in the capacity of 
states to extract, mobilise and re-distribute assets for developmental and other aims. 
Simply put, the historically specific political coalitions underlying state support and 
particularly, the important roles of internal and external threat to political order and 
stability are not incorporated. 
 
                                                 
10   On the Peruvian and Ugandan cases respectively, see Durand and Thorp (1998), and Therkildsen 
(2003).   7
2.3  Political economy approach to tax 
The diversity of patterns of taxation and resource mobilisation among states is clearly a 
product of history. A brief look at the history of today’s developed countries 
demonstrates why an assessment of taxation, good governance and institutional 
formation needs to incorporate an understanding of processes of conflict and bargaining. 
The institutional capacity of states to mobilise resources had to be created. War played 
a particular role in that process, not least because it created a context in which the 
wealthy in society felt threatened enough to allow the creation of capability and the 
centralisation of authority at the level of the state.11 
Standard histories of European state formation underline the crucial contribution of 
external threat and war. Charles Tilly argues that ‘war made the state and the state made 
war’ (Tilly, 1990: 54). War caused states to be more efficient in revenue collection by 
forcing them to dramatically improve administrative capabilities (allowing states to fund 
administrations and economic systems). Most importantly, the effort to finance war and 
the military led to varying patterns of bargains between the state and interest groups, 
particularly merchants, landlords and in some cases, directly with the peasantry. In 
general, the distributional struggles between the state and societal actors (and between 
competing groups within civil society) led to uneven but mutually recognised rights: 
rights of citizens with respect to states as well as the rights of state officials (and 
corporate entities) with respect to citizens. 
Of course, while Heraclitus argued that ‘war is the father of all things’, understanding 
the role of war in the history of institutional formation has its limits as a guide to policy. 
But it does allow us to ask whether there are conditions today that can replicate some of 
the incentives that historically emerged in times of warfare. Threat, which can provide 
‘windows of opportunity’ for tax reform, may today be derived from domestic social 
movements, fiscal crises or the ‘global economy’ rather than imminent prospects of war. 
This historical perspective also allows us to demonstrate that ‘capability’ is not simply 
an inheritance of history – entirely ‘path dependent’ – but has always been created by 
actors who are making history all the time. The formation of the state and its capacity to 
grow and survive was intimately related to its ability to tax. In turn, rights and 
institutions formed as the by-products of bargains, or settlements of conflict, in the 
course of struggle. This is consistent with some theoretical work on institutions that 
view institutional formation as a by-product of distributional struggles and power 
balances.12 
A second important political economy factor in understanding taxation is the role played 
by political organisations that mediate the conflicts between interest groups, classes, and 
coalitions. Political parties are particularly important as they operate in the milieu that 
                                                 
11  For an early and influential analysis of the relationship between war and state formation, and between 
state formation and taxation, see Schumpeter [1918] 1954. In Schumpeter’s analysis, the ‘most 
important cause of financial difficulties consisted in the growing expenses of warfare’ (ibid: 13) and 
that ‘without financial need the immediate cause for the creating of the modern state would have been 
absent’ (ibid: 16). However, see Centeno (1997) and López-Alves (2001) for an analysis of why the 
potential stimulus of war did not transform Latin American states in the nineteenth century in ways 
similar to Western Europe. 
12  See Knight (1992), Moore (1966), and Brenner (1976).   8
links state and civil society and they can provide political support necessary to 
legitimate state tax policies as well as organise demands on the state for social 
expenditure and tax breaks. That tax struggles are among the oldest types of class 
struggles (Goldscheid, 1958: 202) suggests that the power of classes and other interest 
groups are a key determinant of taxation (Campbell, 1993: 168). The historical evidence 
in the now advanced countries suggests that governments run by leftist parties mobilise 
and support higher tax levels (Cameron, 1978) and more progressive tax systems 
(Heidenheimer et al. 1983: 178-9) than those run by conservative parties. The well 
developed welfare states in Scandinavian countries in the second half of the twentieth 
century were controlled by social democratic coalitions. In less developed countries, 
countries with relatively historically high tax collection as a percentage of GDP, such as 
South Africa, Brazil, and Malaysia, are characterised by strong (though not always 
leftist or competitive) political party systems. 
Third, the literature on the ‘resource curse’ in mineral abundant economies has made an 
important contribution to the political economy of tax. The main premise of this model 
is that when states gain a large proportion of their revenues from external sources, such 
as oil rents, the reduced necessity of state decision-makers to levy domestic taxes causes 
leaders to be less accountable to individuals and groups within civil society; more prone 
to engage in and accommodate rent-seeking and corruption; and less able to formulate 
growth-enhancing policies (Mahdavy, 1970; Karl, 1997). Although the literature has 
been an inadequate guide in explaining differential growth performance among oil 
states, and changes in growth rates in particular oil states over time (Di John, 2004), it 
has drawn attention to an important issue, namely that the type of taxes (and not just the 
level) and the manner in which the state appropriates resources is central to 
understanding the historical development of state capacity. 
Finally, a historical perspective highlights the differential impact colonial legacies have 
had on tax structures. For instance, different patterns of English and Spanish 
colonialism and the institutions they left behind have influenced differences in tax 
policy between the Caribbean and Latin America (Thirsk, 1997). In particular, the 
British Caribbean countries inherited legal institutions that enabled the development of 
more formal labour markets which can explain, in part, the higher capacity of these 
countries to collect income tax compared to Central and South American economies 
(Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 2002). Additionally, Caribbean countries generally 
inherited parliamentary systems of governance, which may offer more feasible 
mechanisms of institutionalising pacts with elites to pay taxes than in the generally 
more presidential systems in Latin America (ibid.). 
The differential impact of colonial economic development (and in particular the 
structure of labour markets and the historical process of the integration of indigenous 
populations into the colonial order) appears to have had an impact on the tax collection 
capacities in sub-Saharan Africa too.13 One striking feature of African economies is the 
regional differences in the share of tax revenue in GDP, with countries of Southern 
African (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia) generally having higher tax 
takes and tax effort indicators than would be predicted on the basis of their per capita 
                                                 
13  This paragraph draws on a personal note from Thandika Mkandwire (2005).   9
incomes.14 The reason for this difference owes to the greater formalisation of labour in 
the colonial period in the Southern African economies and Kenya compared with the 
rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Patterns of colonisation have turned out to have produced 
institutional arrangements and practices that have proved remarkably resilient. 
In sum, the political economy approach offers an important complement to the 
economic and administrative frameworks to understanding taxation. In particular, such 
an approach, in providing historical and comparative analyses, can contribute to an 
understanding of why tax capacity differs across countries and changes over time. As 
importantly, this approach not only integrates economic and political processes, but 
specifically examines the interaction of taxation and state formation. 
3  Political settlements and tax capacity in South Africa and Brazil 
The highly successful income and overall tax collection capacity of the South African 
state since the 1960s is particularly instructive of the need to incorporate political 
analysis in an understanding of institutional and administrative reforms. In the period 
1960-2000, South African tax collection as a percentage of GDP has consistently been 
the highest among middle-income countries. In the period 1997-2002, the tax take as a 
percentage of GDP in South Africa averaged over 25 per cent compared with the 
middle-income country average of 15 per cent of GDP. The South African state has 
been particularly successful in collecting direct taxes in the form of corporate and 
personal income taxes, which are generally the most progressive types of tax. In the 
period 1975-78, income tax collection averaged 12.9 per cent of GDP compared with 
the Latin American average of 5.0 per cent and the East Asian average of 5.7 per cent. 
In the more recent period 1997-2002, income tax collection averaged 14.6 per cent of 
GDP compared with the Latin American average of 3.9 per cent and the East Asian 
average of 6.9 per cent. 
The factors that permitted this high level of income tax collection capacity have been 
the subject of considerable analysis (Lieberman, 2001; Friedman and Smith, 2004). 
First, there has been a high degree of cooperation between the state and upper-income 
white groups which supported state-led reforms. This challenges the idea that simply 
instituting and autonomous revenue agency is central to effective tax collection. Second, 
the introduction of computerisation in the 1960s greatly enhanced the ability of the 
Department of Inland Revenue to calculate and issue assessments, to record payments, 
and to register and monitor large tax payers, and maintain controls on tax payments 
more generally. Third, the introduction of a withholding pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) 
system also greatly enhanced tax collection. This system made employees responsible 
for withholding taxes on a monthly basis. The willingness of business owners to 
cooperate greatly reduced the transaction costs of implementing the PAYE system. 
                                                 
14  Tax effort measures the relationship between actual and potential levels of taxation, the latter being 
the predicted value derived from the statistical relationship between the tax share in GDP and various 
combinations of explanatory variables, usually including levels of per capita income; the shares of 
agriculture, industry, and manufacturing in GDP; import shares; and levels of urbanisation. Tax effort 
is the residual of each country’s equation. If it exceeds zero, then a country’s actual level of taxation 
exceeds the predicted one while if it falls below then the country tax level is below its potential.   10
In the post-apartheid state, there have been several further reforms that followed from 
the Katz Commission which included representatives from the state, political parties, 
business chambers, labour unions, and national and international tax and legal experts. 
The Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise departments were integrated in 1995 and 
granted administrative autonomy under the new name South African Revenue Service 
(SARS) in 1997. The high degree of consultation within the state and between the state 
and interest groups were crucial to enhancing the legitimacy of the reforms. The key 
feature that marked the continued success of SARS in tax collection capacity was the 
high degree of administrative cooperation within the state, particularly between SARS, 
the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank. Such cooperation allowed for exchange in 
information that improved budget planning and tracking tax evasion. In sum, the 
mutually supportive ministerial relationships improved the resource mobilisation 
capacity of the state.  
While the above discussion examined the technical means through which tax capacity 
developed in South Africa, such dynamic capacity-building can not be understood 
without examining politics, which is the terrain upon which these technical capacities 
are legitimated and rules of the game enforced. Historical political analysis contributes 
greatly to explaining why the tax capacity, in general, and the income tax collection 
capacity, in particular, of the South African state was high relative to that in other 
middle-income countries.  
For Lieberman (2001), the historical process in which the national political community 
was constructed in the early 1900s contributes greatly in explaining the evolution of 
income tax capacity in South Africa. The 1909 Constitution defined the South African 
polity along two main lines. First, it created an exclusionary racial state that eventually 
manifested itself in the form of apartheid. Second, it created a unified central state. In 
terms of the first factor, the white supremacy that was embodied in the state’s laws and 
codes legitimated the state for white-owned firms and white upper-income groups. The 
apartheid state influenced the calculations of upper income groups, who became assured 
that their income tax would benefit ‘their own’ group, and not ‘the other’. At the same 
time, a racially defined project allowed lower income whites to demand progressive 
taxation by drawing on the shared identity of a cross-class white project. Importantly, 
the centralised and national structure of white-based unions and political parties helped 
lower the transaction costs of collective action that are more prevalent in decentralised 
and regionally-based party systems and unions. 
The contrast of the South African experience with the Brazilian tax state in the twentieth 
century is instructive of the value of comparative historical political economy analysis 
in understanding variations in income tax capacity. The Brazilian state has indeed 
achieved among the highest tax takes as a percentage of GDP in Latin America (and 
indeed among all less developed countries) in the twentieth century, and in the period 
1990-2004, has increased its take from 22 per cent of GDP to over 30 per cent of GDP. 
However, in comparison with South Africa, the Brazilian state tax system is much more 
regressive and is characterised by a more adversarial as opposed to cooperative 
relationship between the state and upper-income groups (Lieberman, 2001). As such, 
the Brazilian state collects less than one-third the South African rate of income tax and 
relies on a series of inefficient and regressive indirect taxes such as multi-tiered VAT, 
and financial transaction taxes (Schneider, 2005).   11
The comparison of South Africa and Brazil is interesting since both share many 
common features. Both are economies are upper middle-income, semi-industrialised 
economies that have followed a largely inward-looking state-led import-substitution 
regime for most of the second half of the twentieth century. Both also have among the 
most unequal income distributions in the world. The main difference, according to 
Lieberman, is that, in Brazil, the polity was defined as a non-racial federation where 
regional interests were much more salient than in the South African state, which 
developed a more centralised state along racial lines. As a result, race did not become an 
idiom along which upper-income white groups in Brazil could develop cross-class 
alliances and solidarity. The regional nature of the polity meant that both firms and 
white upper-income groups were less willing to cooperate with state as they were not 
confident that direct taxes would be used to benefit ‘their’ region. As a result, elites 
continued to challenge state efforts to increase income tax in the course of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, regionalism bred greater polarisation and fragmentation of political 
parties and labour unions which weakened the collective capacity of lower income 
groups to demand more progressive taxation.15 
This comparative analysis highlights why focusing on technical capacity or structural 
economic factors (e.g. income distribution, per capita income) is insufficient in 
explaining the differential income tax collection capacity of South Africa and Brazil. 
Rather, this comparative analysis highlights the importance of considering the structure 
of political institutions and settlements, and the way in which the national political 
community is defined as critical to understanding the evolution of tax capacity of 
states.16 As such, the political economy approach provides a lens of analysis that probes 
beyond issues raised by the economic and administrative approaches. 
It is also important to highlight that state capacity to tax does not necessarily translate 
into equally effective state capacities to govern the economy in other policy areas. In 
other words, state capacity is not necessarily uniform across administrative functions. 
For example, while the South African state has been a champion income tax collector, 
its industrial policy has been far less effective. The record of the South African state 
promoting world-class industrial infant industries has been far less successful than, for 
example in South Korea or even Brazil. As in tax policy, detailed historical political 
economy analyses would be required to explain these differences of capacity both 
across states for a particular function (say, industrial policy) as well differences within 
state-society relations across several functions (e.g. tax, industrial policy, social service 
provision and so on). The policy implication is that designing reforms requires an 
historical and political understanding of the coalitions opposing and supporting reforms 
for specific policy areas within a country. There is no reason why the political economy 
dynamics and obstacles will be the same for each reform issue. 
                                                 
15  Even in Lula da Silva’s administration, income tax has remained off the agenda despite the fact that 
the Worker’s Party (PT) has risen on a social democratic platform. 
16  However, in a larger comparative perspective, the focus on ethnicity/race and regionalism does not 
explain why tax capacities differ within Latin America and differ across middle-income countries 
more generally.    12
4  Tax compositions in Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe  
and South Africa 
There has been very little systematic comparison of the composition of tax across 
developing regions. As Lieberman’s study comparing South Africa and Brazil suggests, 
overall take collection figures can mask important differences in developmental 
capacities of states. The capacity of states to collect direct taxes (income and property 
taxes) provides an important window into their power and legitimacy vis-à-vis upper 
income and middle-class groups. The aim here will be to underscore differences in the 
types of taxes collected between middle-income regions.  
Consider the differences between Latin American and East Asian economies during 
1997-2002 in terms of the share of direct taxes collected as a percentage of GDP. In this 
period, personal income and property tax collection in East Asia was, on average, 4 
times higher as a proportion of national income than it was in Latin America as 
indicated in Table 2.  
Moreover, the share of personal income and property tax as a percentage of GDP was 
six times higher in Eastern Europe compared with Latin America’s average. This 
significant difference in personal income tax collection in 1997 is not due to any 
substantial differences in income per capita between the regions.  
The very low personal income tax burden in Latin America is due to several factors, all 
of which point to states in the region with weak leverage over the elite economic 
classes. First, the average maximum personal income rate has fallen from an average of 
50 per cent in 1985-86 to 38 per cent in 1991, and 34 per cent in 1997, a rate of decline 
‘that is considerably more rapid than in the OECD, where the top rates declined from 
52.8 per cent in 1985-86 to 43.6 per cent by 1997’ (Shome, 1999: 3-4). Second, poor 
administrative capacity and high level of tax evasion limit the productivity of tax 
collection (Shome, 1999). Third, while the top marginal personal income tax rate has 
been reduced in the 1990s, the top personal exemption level in terms of GDP per capita 
has risen from 1.29 in 1991 to 1.36 in 1997 (ibid.: 6). If one were to add that the 
significant levels of foreign savings held by Latin Americans (the result of several 
episodes of massive capital flight) are not taxed, it would not be unreasonable to argue 
that the economic elite in the region are the group least preyed on by their respective 
states.17 These trends obviously imply that the tax burden of the upper income groups is 
negligible. 
When one expands the category of direct taxes to include corporate income tax, East 
Asia still collects over 75 per cent more as a percentage of GDP than in Latin America 
in the period 1997-2002 as indicated in Table 3. The Eastern European economies in the 
sample had more than double the income tax collection as a share of GDP compared 
with Latin America. It is again worth highlighting the extraordinarily high income tax 
capacity of South Africa, which was discussed earlier. 
 
                                                 
17  Tanzi & Zee (2000: 30) note that Latin American countries have virtually stopped taxing financial 
income to avoid chronic capital flight.   13
Table 2: Personal income and property tax burden: Latin America, East Asia, South Africa and 
Eastern Europe compared 
(Ratio of personal income and property tax as a per cent of GDP, %) 
  1975-78 1985-88 1997-2002 2000 GDP per capita 
Latin America       (2000  US$) 
Average 1.7  1.2  1.0  $4,399 
Argentina 0.4  0.8  1.1  7,726 
Brazil 0.2  0.2  1.4  3,537 
Chile 3.3  1.1  na  4,964 
Colombia 1.8  1.6*  0.6  1,979 
Costa Rica  2.9  2.2  0.7  4,185 
Mexico   2.7  2.0  na  5,935 
Peru   1.5  na  1.5  2,046 
Venezuela 1.0  1.0  1.0  4,818 
East Asia        
Average 1.8  2.3  3.9  3,716 
Indonesia 0.8  0.9  3.5 800 
Korea 1.9  2.8  3.6  10,890 
Malaysia 2.1  2.4  6.1  3,881 
Philippines 1.6  1.1  2.6  990 
Thailand 1.1  1.9  2.2  2,020 
Taiwan 3.4  4.5  5.2   
Eastern Europe        
Average    6.8 4,327 
Latvia     6.5  3,259 
Estonia     7.7  3,987 
Poland     6.7  4,309 
Hungary     7.8  4,656 
Czech Republic      5.2  5,422 
Source:   IMF Government Finance Statistics; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2002 for 
Taiwan.   14
Table 3: Income, profits and capital gains burden: East Asia, Latin America, South Africa and 
Eastern Europe compared 
(Tax on income profits and capital gains as a per cent of GDP, %) 
  Income, profits and capital gains burden 
  1975-78 1985-88 1997-2002 
Latin America       
Average 5.0  4.1  3.9 
Average (excluding Venezuela)  3.2  3.0  3.8 
Argentina 0.7  0.8  2.2 
Brazil 3.2  4.4  4.5 
Chile 3.8  4.0  4.2 
Colombia 3.7  3.1  4.7 
Costa Rica  2.8  2.4  2.8 
Mexico 5.6  4.4  4.9 
Peru 2.7  2.0  3.5 
Venezuela 17.6  12.0  4.7 
East Asia      
Average 5.7  6.0  6.9 
Average (excluding Indonesia)  4.4  5.2  6.3 
Korea 4.2  4.8  5.5 
Malaysia 8.3  9.6  8.4 
Philippines 2.8  3.2  6.3 
Indonesia 12.6  10.3  9.5 
Thailand 2.1  3.2  5.0 
Taiwan 4.0  4.8  6.6 
South Africa  12.9  13.1  14.6 
Eastern Europe      
Average     8.3 
Latvia     7.5 
Estonia     8.5 
Poland     7.9 
Hungary     9.3 
Czech Republic      8.4 
Source:   IMF Government Finance Statistics, and International Financial Statistics; Statistical Yearbook of 
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Table 4: VAT in Latin America, East Asia, South Africa and Eastern Europe compared 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
   1975-78  1985-88  1997-2002 
Latin America     
Average 2.5  3.6  5.6 
Argentina 1.1  1.8  3.8 
Brazil 0.0  8.7  12.1 
Chile 6.5  8.1  8.2 
Colombia 1.8  2.8  4.8 
Costa Rica  1.6  2.8  4.8 
Mexico 2.5  3.1  3.2 
Peru   4.4  1.8  6.4 
Venezuela na  0.0  4.3 
East Asia     
Average 2.0  2.3  2.9 
Indonesia 1.6  2.8  3.5 
Korea 2.6  3.5  4.1 
Malaysia 1.2  1.5  2.0 
Philippines 1.9  1.1  1.7 
Thailand 2.7  2.8  3.4 
Taiwan na  na  na 
South Africa  1.2  6.1  6.1 
Eastern Europe     
Average     7.4 
Latvia     7.4 
Estonia     8.2 
Poland     7.3 
Hungary     9,0 
Czech Republic      6.5 
Source:   IMF Government Finance Statistics and International Financial Statistics. 
The lower levels of income tax collection has meant that the burden of structural change 
in tax falls relatively more on indirect taxes in Latin America than in East Asia, Eastern 
Europe, and South Africa. As seen in Table 4, ratio of VAT to GDP is significantly 
higher in Latin America compared to East Asia in the period 1997-2002.18 
                                                 
18  It is important to note here that standard analysis of tax incidence indicates that who bears the ultimate 
burden of the tax may be substantially different from who pays the tax in the first instance. For 
example, a corporation may not pay the full amount of a corporate tax if it can shift some of that 
burden to consumers via higher prices or if it can force workers to accept a lower wage (see Stiglitz, 
1986: 411-55).   16
In the period 1997-2002, VAT-to-GDP ratios averaged 5.6 per cent in Latin America 
compared to 2.9 per cent in East Asia. While it is true that South Africa has a higher 
VAT-to-GDP ratio than both regions, VAT in South Africa represents a lower 
percentage of total taxes than in either region since income tax collection is, at 14.6 per 
cent of GDP, a much more significant component of total tax collection. The same story 
applies to Eastern Europe though to a lesser extent. 
These patterns have several important implications. First, indirect taxes, and in 
particular VAT, which is generally one of the more regressive taxes, is occupying a 
relatively higher share within the overall tax burden in Latin America.19 Second, as a 
result of the low levels of income tax collection, the region’s tax collection is only 16 
per cent of GDP when the international norm, given the region’s average income per 
capita, should be 24 per cent of GDP (IADB, 1998: 6). Third, the poor tax effort and the 
reliance on generally regressive indirect taxes in Latin America are reflective of the 
weakness of the state vis-à-vis upper income groups. Finally, in comparison with East 
Asia and Eastern Europe, the tax effort in Latin America is further from achieving re-
distributive goals. This is because the challenges of re-distribution are much greater in 
Latin America because income distribution is, on average, much more unequal than in 
the other two regions (IADB, 1998). Without an explicit political programme to 
redesign and enforce personal income tax collection, the level and progressiveness of 
taxation and hence poverty reduction strategies in Latin America would appear limited, 
particularly in the context of persistently high income and asset inequality. 
5  Creating tax capacity in low-income/post-war economies 
The challenges of tax collection are formidable in low-income and especially in low-
income post-war economies. The ratio of government revenue to gross domestic product 
in war economies is, on average, well below the average for non-war economies with 
similar levels of per capita income (Gupta et al. 2004; Addison et al. 2004). In the post-
war economies of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda, for 
example, the most salient features are that the tax base is relatively low, dependent to a 
large measure on trade taxes, and is extremely narrow where ‘large’ payers (which are 
generally in the range of 300) contribute between 40 and 70 per cent of domestic 
revenue collection (Di John, 2005: 1). The need to widen the coverage of the tax base is 
urgent in these countries as is the need to examine the political economy of large 
taxpayer offices in the government. 
The dependence on trade taxes in low-income/post-war economies presents specific 
policy challenges. Trade liberalization in these economies has led to reductions in trade 
taxes, which are the main source of revenue in weak and low income states (ibid.: 2). 
Moreover, alternative tax revenue (such as from VAT and income tax) have risen 
significantly less than the decline in trade tax revenue. The overall effect has been a 
decline in total tax revenues as a percentage of national income in low income 
countries. Evidence presented by the IMF (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005) have found that 
                                                 
19  In theory, the overall impact of VAT need not be regressive.  This would be the case if luxury items 
are taxed at a higher rate than basic goods, and if public expenditure that is financed by VAT is 
targeted to lower-income groups.   17
low income countries typically recover only 30 cents on each dollar lost to trade tax 
declines. 
The experience of Uganda provides an important exception to this trend. Under the 
Museveni regime, trade liberalization (that is the decline in import and export tariffs) 
was imposed gradually over the period 1986-98.
 Rodrik (2004) classifies Uganda as a 
case, not of shock therapy liberalisation, but one of moderate and gradual reform. Non-
tariff barriers were removed for the first time in 1991; six years after Museveni took 
power. In 1995, there were still import quotas on beer, beverages, and auto parts. In 
1999, all non-tariff barriers were eliminated. It was only in the early 1990s that the 
structure of trade taxes was switched from export taxation to import taxation, but import 
tariffs were introduced at a high level. There were few options available for alternative 
types of taxation, a characteristic of very poor economies with weak fiscal institutions. 
As a result, import taxes necessarily lead fiscal resource mobilisation in the 1990s. In 
1996, ten years after the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) regime took power, 
trade taxes still accounted for more than 50 per cent of total tax revenues. 
This gradualism of trade liberalization proved crucial to maintaining fiscal revenues 
until the political and administrative problems of introducing VAT could be overcome. 
The tax revenues in Uganda increased from 7 per cent of GDP in 1986 to nearly 11 per 
cent by the mid-1990s. While this is still below the sub-Saharan African average, the 
fiscal consequences of more rapid trade liberalization could have been devastating. The 
case against rapid tariff reduction as a means for maintaining and increasing fiscal 
resources, a key element in state consolidation and state-building, is one of the main 
lessons in the political economy of the Ugandan post-war reconstruction. 
Collier and Reinikka (2001) argue that the substitution of export with import taxes 
created greater inefficiencies because import taxes were subject to greater dispersion of 
tax rates since the latter were subject to more tax rates than the former. This is 
misleading in several respects. First, the replacement of export taxes was important in 
improving incentives for exports. Second, the substitution of export taxes with import 
taxes (however much dispersion) was essential for maintaining resource mobilisation, 
which was central to state-building. Third, a dispersion of import taxes allows the state 
to provide selective rents (and therefore incentives) for the development of particular 
sectors.
20 A uniform import rate provides much less scope for industrial and agricultural 
strategies. Finally, the argument that trade policy created static inefficiencies does not 
explain why Uganda achieved one of the fastest growth rates in the developing world 
over the period 1986-99.
21 Tariffs on commodity exports, for example, while potentially 
providing some disincentives to production, were the only mechanism to tax incomes of 
wealthy farmers. Export tariffs thus can provide a functional substitute to weak income 
                                                 
20    Tariffs also provide a fiscally more sustainable mechanism to promote domestic industry in low 
income countries. The Museveni regime has used these tools to fuel infant industries such as the 
flower cutting industries whose exports have grown rapidly. While export subsidies may be less 
distortionary than tariffs, fiscal constraints in low income countries prevent the extensive use of 
subsidies as a tool of industrial policy. 
21  By the mid-1990s, there were still five bands of ad valorem import tariff rates between 0 and 60 per 
cent, though more than 95 per cent of the imported items were between 10 and 30 per cent. During the 
latter half of the 1990s, the NRM regime implemented further trade reforms, which gave Uganda one 
of the lowest tariff structures in Africa. Since 1999, the maximum tariff was 15 per cent on consumer 
goods, 7 per cent on intermediate goods, and zero on capital goods.   18
tax capacity in low income/post-war economies. In the Ugandan case, such tariffs did 
not coincide with a decline in export growth, but rather were compatible with relatively 
rapid export and production growth in commodities (Di John and Putzel, 2005). 
The Afghan case also highlights important political economy issues concerning tax 
reform in a low-income/post-war context. Afghanistan has one of the weakest tax 
collection capacities in the world. According to IMF estimates, government revenue as a 
percentage of non-drug GDP will be 5.4 per cent in 2005-06, the lowest figure for any 
country in the world (Rubin, 2006: 26). James Boyce (2003: 7-8; forthcoming) suggests 
that fiscal capacity has been crucial for the viability and sustainability of the state, 
particularly given the short attention span and shifting priorities of external donors. 
What seems clear in the Afghan case is that the state’s command over legitimate force 
and legitimate fiscal capacities are closely interlinked, once again highlighting the limits 
of a purely technical approach to taxation.  
There are several insights on the relationship between state-building and public finance 
that are highlighted in Boyce’s work. First, there were three main principles that were 
important as foundations of sound revenue collections: a) the methods chosen should be 
easy to handle administratively; b) they should honour progressivity in order to reduce 
rather than exacerbate distributive tensions by taxing those with ability to pay; and 
c) they should be underpinned by legitimacy. 
Second, there is a need to re-think the policy of exempting high-income expatriates 
from paying taxes despite the fact that they often earn 100 times the national average 
salary. This exemption creates a demonstration effect to high-income nationals that it is 
legitimate for upper income groups not to contribute to tax collection. Boyce points to 
three tax measures which would help the international community to play a catalytic 
role in the revenue area, analogous to its potential role in the expenditure and security 
arenas: a) the introduction of an income tax on high income expatriates, voluntarily paid 
and a measure of high symbolic value; b) the introduction of income and property taxes 
on high income citizens because the influx of external resources is a major source of a 
considerable increase in income for some well-placed Afghan citizens; and c) a customs 
duty on imported luxuries that is backed up by the willingness of international actors to 
forego exemptions and immunities. Such measures could easily be put into practice 
administratively and work as a nucleus of revenue collection capacity while at the same 
time would enhance legitimacy. It would also set the stage for state-elite bargains over 
tax collection to become an institutionalized feature of the polity. 
Given the weak state capacity to collect tax in Afghanistan, trade taxes will inevitably 
be the most feasible source of tax collection. However, raising the level of import taxes 
is not simply a question of trade policy. The inability of the Afghan state to control 
much of the territory outside the capital, Kabul, including border areas impedes the 
collection of trade taxes. The presence of entrenched warlords weakens the state’s 
monopoly not only on revenue collection but also on the legitimate exercise of force 
(Boyce, forthcoming). In this sense, raising trade taxes will require increased military 
and security presence of the central state in border regions, a feat unlikely to be 
achieved without international military assistance (Ghani  et al., forthcoming: 26). 
Clearly, in post-war economies, capacity to collect even the ‘easiest’ taxes is closely 
linked to issues of security and the legitimate monopolization of violence on the part of 
the central state.   19
On the expenditure side, aid would do more to promote capacity to plan and execute 
policies if channelled through the central government. The current situation features a 
dual public sector where the bulk of expenditure (including procurement, the payments 
system and the delivery of services) is made directly by donors with only a small per 
cent of spending going through the parliament and the budget process. While 
international service provision is generally more efficient currently, the long-run 
consequences for state-building are likely to be negative. This is because foreign 
spending is not accountable and there is a lack of coordination of aid which wastes 
scarce resources. Most worrying is the high opportunity cost of not permitting the state 
to develop reciprocal relationships and mutual obligations with interest groups, which 
the fiscal system can enhance. 
Both the Ugandan and Afghan case illustrate several important points. First, taxation is 
central to the prospects of state formation and legitimacy. Second, rapid trade 
liberalization can be de-stabilising to the tax collection capacity and state-building 
project in low-income/post-war economies. Finally, the exemption of high income 
foreign aid workers from paying income and consumption taxes signals that 
progressivity is not either feasible or desirable. This is creates a demonstration effect 
that regressivity is acceptable, which can undermine the process of building state 
legitimacy. 
6  International obstacles to tax collection: the problem of capital flight 
Another important concern for many countries, developed and less developed, is the 
extent to which international financial liberalisation has facilitated capital flight to 
onshore and offshore financial centres (for a discussion of the definitions and 
measurements of capital flight, see Beja Jr., 2005). The Tax Justice Network has 
estimated that capital flight from all countries, including funds undeclared in the 
country of residence, is approximately $US11.5 trillion (Spencer, 2006). Annual global 
income from such sources is conservatively estimated at $US860 billion, and the annual 
worldwide tax revenue lost is approximately US$255 billion, which equals the funds 
estimated to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals (ibid.). 
Capital flight incurs many economic, political and social costs. Particularly when capital 
is scarce, capital flight results in a loss of resources to finance investments in 
infrastructure and social spending. Capital flight also lessens the resources available for 
investment more generally. This contributes to declines in growth rates which results in 
growing unemployment, informalisation of economic activity, and poverty. Declining 
investment also harms the technological upgrading required to keep exports 
competitive. In many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, 
capital flight has been accompanied by increases in foreign borrowing – that is, 
increased indebtedness has been used, not to finance investment or even consumption, 
but to finance capital flight itself (Rodríguez, 1987; Boyce and Ndikumana, 2005). The 
resulting debt burdens are likely to most hurt the poor as social spending and 
infrastructural spending needs to be cut in the face of debt repayments. 
Despite the global nature of the capital flight problem, there are important regional 
differences between developing regions. Consider Table 5.   20
Table 5: Capital flight as a share of private wealth in Latin America and East Asia 
(percentage) 
  1980-89 (a) 1990-98 (a) 1980-89 (b) 1990-98 (b) 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  27.6 30.1 27.4 30.3 
Latin America and Caribbean  8.5  9.0  7.5  7.9 
East Asia and Pacific  4.5  5.0  2.0  2.7 
Note: (a) all observations; (b) full data points only 
Source: Collier et al. (2004: table 1A, p. 22) 
 
Capital flight as a share of private wealth has been estimated by Collier et al. (2004) to 
be between two to three times higher in Latin America compared to East Asia in the 
1980s and 1990s. For sub-Saharan Africa, the situation is even worse. In the region 
where capital is most scarce, capital flight as a percentage of private wealth was, on 
average, six times higher than in East Asia in the 1980s and over ten times higher than 
East Asia in the 1990s.22 It is likely that capital flight both caused and was caused by 
lower growth, macroeconomic instability and political instability in Latin America and 
sub-Saharan Africa. Whatever the mechanisms, capital flight in both regions has 
severely lowered the tax base and with it, the domestic resources available to finance 
public investment in infrastructure and social services. 
Policy proposals to address the tax revenues lost due to capital flight include selective 
use of capital controls, overriding bank secrecy in onshore and offshore financial 
centres, improvements in tax administration in less developed countries, and further 
implementation of tax information exchanges between countries (Spencer, 2006). 
Exchange of information on capital flight between governments was advocated by John 
Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the principal architects of the Bretton Woods 
institutions in 1944 (Heillener, 2005: 289-91). This proposal was opposed by the US 
financial community which had benefited from capital flight (ibid.: 291). Another more 
radical solution would involve selectively repudiating past loans, invoking the doctrine 
of ‘odious debt’ in international law as well as historical precedent (Boyce and 
Ndikumana, 2005).23 The idea here is to repatriate funds that were illegally transferred 
out of the country by state leaders. Some analysts have also suggested that the IMF, 
World Bank and OECD should take the lead in implementing an international financial 
architecture to reduce the incentives and means for engaging in capital flight (Spencer, 
2006). As in the past, the financial community in the advanced industrial countries as 
well as wealthier individuals and corporations in the poorer countries would likely 
oppose such policy proposals. Nevertheless, it would be possible to make the case that 
taxpayers in the OECD countries would shoulder less of the burden of financing 
international aid if tax revenues lost from capital flight (both from developed and less 
developed country residents) were re-captured and/or prevented. 
                                                 
22  These estimates, of course, do not indicate variations within regions. 
23    Boyce and Ndikumana (2005: 338) note: ‘At the end of the 19th century, the US government 
repudiated the external debt owed by Cuba after seizing the island in the Spanish-American War. The 
US authorities did this on the grounds that Cuba’s debt had not been incurred for the benefit of the 
Cuban people, that it had been contracted without their consent and that the loans helped to finance 
their repression by the Spanish colonial government.’   21
7 Conclusion   
The main theme emerging from a historical perspective on taxation is that while 
technical aspects of tax reform are crucial, an understanding of the sustainability of 
reforms is not possible without understanding how reforms become legitimate. Because 
taxation affects incentives and distribution simultaneously, tax reform requires either a 
degree of social consensus that such policies are in the collective interest and/or it 
requires a state with the ability to coerce those who challenge its allocations. The focus 
on institutional designs (such as the degree of autonomy) and other technical issues of 
tax is incomplete since it ignores the political nature of taxation. 
While the current focus on VAT and tax simplification have been useful to initiating tax 
revenue collection reforms, the more difficult administrative tasks of tax collection 
require further attention. The capacity approach of the World Bank and the IMF has 
been pragmatic in focusing attention on feasible revenue generation in the short- and 
medium-run. However, the long-run consolidation of tax states requires a diversification 
toward more direct and progressive income and property taxes. This is particularly the 
case in countries with very unequal income distributions. 
The stakes of deepening the tax capacity in late developers are great. Tax contributes to 
making operational the social contract, and in particular, to creating the mutual 
obligations between state decision-makers and relevant political actors. Of critical 
importance to poor late developers is the development of bargaining mechanisms 
between the state and elite groups, who generally control much of the production and 
export sectors of the economy. Because direct taxes are more challenging to collect in 
both administrative and political terms, apolitical and ahistorical approaches to state 
capacity are inadequate. A major challenge of research for the development community 
is to develop a more strategic, historical, and politically informed basis to promote the 
more difficult tax reforms. 
It is also important to distinguish low-income/post-war economies from middle-income 
countries when designing tax reform policy. The potential for revenue diversification 
toward direct taxes is higher in the latter set of countries since both administrative 
capacity and political stability are generally greater. Tax reform policies need to take 
account of context, and particularly the stage of development. An overarching policy 
blueprint is likely to be unhelpful in creating feasible tax capacity in historically specific 
contexts. 
   22
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